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Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to examine the Audit Firm Rotation and Audit Quality using Evidence from selected 
Ethiopia Commercial Banks in Addis Abeba, Ethiopia. The main objective of the study is to examine the extent 
that audit firm rotation significantly affects audit quality, and to evaluate the relationship between board 
independence and audit quality. The possibility of enhancing audit quality through audit firm rotation is a key 
method used by regulatory body. This study intended to assess the applicability of the mandatory auditor rotation 
concept in the Ethiopian banking sector so as to enhance and improve audit quality, from the findings of both the 
literature as well as the field survey, it was discovered that audit firm rotation significantly affect audit quality. It 
was concluded that rotation is a good solution to enhance Audit quality and also to maintain the auditor 
independence by decreasing the audit firm’s dependence on the client. Recommendations were made based on the 
findings that the regulatory bodies such as National Bank of Ethiopia, Federal Auditor General should make a laws 
that will appreciate audit firm rotation in order to improve audit quality, also the National Bank of Ethiopia should 
think of possible other ways of addressing the concept of audit quality.    
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1. Background of the Study  
The issue of Audit quality has attracted enormous attention since the financial reporting mis-representation and 
falsification of data stared in major world corporations like Enron and World Com in the United State of America 
as well as Parallax in Italy. It is defined as the auditor’s ability to discover a breach in the client’s accounting 
system combined with the auditor’s willingness to report such breach (Deangelo, 1981; Watts & Zimmerman, 
1981). Riyatno (2007), defines audit quality as something that is abstract, difficult to measure and can only be 
perceived by the users of audit services. Thus, there is no uniform definition of audit quality. While Dc Angelo 
(1981) as cited in Ibrahim (2001) defines audit quality as the combined probability to detect and report material 
errors in financial statements, Pawulos (2002) defines audit quality in terms of the level of assurance since the 
purpose of an audit is to provide reasonable assurance to users on financial statements.  
The 2006 EC the where a core banking system agreement among all commercial banks in Ethiopia, and this 
consolidation of banking sector in Ethiopian brought about the introduction of mandatory audit firm rotation as 
part of banks’ code of corporate governance with the aim of further strengthening audit quality. Mandatory audit 
firm rotation became topical after the simultaneous speech of 8 banks chiefs by the governor of National Bank of 
Ethiopia in 2007 EC, and the imposition of external auditors rotation after 10 years of engagement by the national 
bank. It was also said by the national bank that for the avoidance of doubt, the maximum period of 10 years shall 
include the period an audit firm that started new era for banking sector in Ethiopia.  
Mandatory rotation of external auditors requires audit firms to be rotated after a specified number of years 
irrespective of the quality, independence of the audit firm, the willingness of the shareholders and the management 
to keep the firm. Anteneh, D ( 2011) in his research agreed that that audit firm rotation improves audit objectivity 
and that long-term relationships between companies and their auditors tends to reduce auditors’ independence and 
quality and  According to Hayle, (2010) a client maybe a significant source of revenue for an auditor and the 
auditor may be reluctant to jeopardize the revenue stream as he would not want to miss the money that feeds him. 
The audit quality is also diminished with long term audit tenure, so that mandatory firm rotation will reduce the 
familiarity threat, ensures auditors independence and provides a greater skepticism and a fresh perspective that 
may be lacking in long-standing audit or client relationship Jackson (2013) 
 
1.1 Statement of Problem  
There are many different privies studies (Arrunada & Paz-Ares, 2007; Brody & Mokenin, 2010; Dopuch, King & 
Schwartz, 2011; Musa & Omer, 2013) have tried to examine possible explanatory variables for the state of audit 
quality. The presence of audit failures in the world has brought a great deal of disappointment to stakeholders and 
investors, and the longness of audit firm tenure has also been linked with fraudulent financial reporting which can 
be reduced by the audit firm rotation and improves audit quality as auditors may need to be experts in their area 
and acquire client-specific knowledge overtime (Ghosh & Moon, 2011; Defond & Francis, 2005; Jenkins & Velury, 
2014). This means that audit quality is lower during the early years of the auditor-client relationship and increases 
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with length of audit firm rotation due to the reduction in information communication between auditor and client 
(Aziza, Mokenin & Sheba, 2016).  
Therefore, this study extends and contributes to the body of research using data from Ethiopian banking sector 
by investigating the enhancement of Audit Quality through audit firm rotation. 
 
1.2 Research Questions  
For this study the following four basic research questions are considered:  
1. To what extent does audit firm rotation significantly affect audit quality?  
2.  Is there any relationship between company size and audit quality?  
3. How do audit fees affect audit quality?  
4. What is the relationship between board independence and audit quality?  
 
1.3 Objectives of the Study  
The general objective of this study is to examine the enhancement of audit quality through audit firm rotation. The 
specific objectives of the study are as follows  
To examine the extent that audit firm rotation significantly affects audit quality;  
To determine the relationship between company size and audit quality;  
To investigate how audit fees affects audit quality; and  
To evaluate the relationship between board independence and audit quality.  
 
1.4 Research Hypotheses  
The hypotheses stated below are raised in order to achieve the specific objectives of this study. 
                       Hypothesis one  
HO: Audit firm rotation contributes negatively to the quality of audit assignment. 
HI: Audit firm rotation contributes positively to the quality of audit assignment.  
                      Hypothesis two  
HO: There is no significant relationship between the firm’s size and audit quality. 
HI: There is significant relationship between the firm’s size and audit quality. 
                      Hypothesis three  
HO: There is no significant relationship between board independence and audit quality. 
HI: There is significant relationship between board independence and audit quality. 
                       Hypothesis four  
HO: There is no significant relationship between affecting audit quality.  
HI: There is significant relationship between affecting audit quality.  
 
1.5 Limitation of the Study  
Since this study focused on Ethiopia banks, the findings may not be applicable to other companies in a different 
sector because of the individual characteristics and behaviors of different industries or sectors.  
 
2. Review of Related Literature   
In this chapter both theoretical literature review and empirical literature reviews are considered. 
 
2.1 The Concept of Audit Quality  
Auditing is the activity carried on by the auditor when he verifies accounting data determines the accuracy and 
reliability of accounting statements and then reports on his findings. It is basically an activity carried on by an 
independent person with the aim of reporting on the true and fairness of financial statements (Mill champ, 1994). 
Auditing of financial statement is the systematic process of objectively obtaining and evaluating evidence 
regarding assertions about economic actions and events to ascertain the degree of correspondence between these 
assertions and established criteria and communicating the results to interested users (Gramling, Ritten berg & John 
stone, 2010). In essence, auditing is used to provide the needed reasonable assurance for financial statement users 
who rely on audited financial statements. Furthermore, the role of auditing is to reduce the information gap on 
accounting numbers and to decrease the loss due to the managers’ discretion in financial reporting.  
According to Royalton (2007), audit quality is something that is abstract, difficult to measure and can only 
be perceived by the users of audit services so that until now there is no uniform definition of audit quality. Wallace 
(1980) also notes that a measure of audit quality is the audit’s ability to reduce noise, bias and improve the quality 
in accounting information. As noted by Levitt (2000), the perception of audit quality plays a critical role in 
maintaining systematic confidence in the integrity. Of financial reporting. The higher the perceived audit quality, 
the more credible the financial statements. Moidrich, Jackson and Roebuck (2007) posit that true audit quality is 
when the audit does not result in a type 1 error(a failing company being given an unqualified report) or a type II 
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error(a non- failing company being given a qualified report). Audit quality is characterized by some of the 
following characteristics as posited by Yamane (2011). 
Significance: This portrays the relevance of the matter that is being examined in the audit. This can be measured 
by using the financial size of the auditee and the performance effects that the auditee has on the public  
Reliability: The audit findings and conclusions with respect to the matter being examined. The audit reports are 
measured to know if they can be reliable.  
Objectively: The audit will be checked to know if it is carried out in an impartial and fair manner without favor or 
bias. The auditor is expected to prepare and present his report and opinion purely on fact and on sound analysis.  
Scope: The task plan and execution of the audit must satisfactorily cover all areas.  
Timeliness: The time the results are delivered is also important because it also affect audit quality. The results 
should be presented when it is most useful in correcting management weaknesses.  
Clarity: The audit report must be clear enough for others not in the field to still understand the message being 
passed across.  
Efficiency: The distribution of the resources has to be assigned to the audit reasonably in the light of the 
significance and complexity of the audit.  
 
2.2 Audit Quality and Audit Firm Rotation  
The idea of auditor rotation was first introduced and discussed in 1976 (Hoyle 1986). It is classified into mandatory 
or voluntary rotation. The mandatory rotation makes it compulsory for firms to change their auditors after a fixed 
duration (Lu, 2005) while the voluntary rotation is optional. Mandatory rotation could be either through the audit 
firm rotation which requires listed companies to change or rotate their CPA firms after a specific period of time or 
through the audit partner rotation which requires audit firms to change or rotate the audit lead partner who is in 
charge of an audit client after a specific period of time instead of the whole CPA firm (Arel, Richard, Brody& 
Pany, 2005; Orin, 2008). Voluntary rotation is mainly based on the management decisions and choice regardless 
of time to change their auditor. This decision may be due to factors other than compulsion by regulatory authorities.  
Over the years, mandatory audit firm rotation has been examined by many authors, some have supported it while 
others opposed. Arguments supporting audit firm rotation include: Reborn (2006) who asserts that it might provide 
smaller audit firms the opportunity to participate and earn income due to increasing market competition. They also 
noted that mandatory rotation causes improvement in the work of an audit firm since it knows its work will be 
reviewed by another audit firm when they are rotated after a specific period of time (Davis, 2008). It is also argued 
that rotation provides new insight to the client’s financial statements. Since the auditing practice is based on 
employing professional skepticism and the short term client auditor relationship can reduce the sharpness of his 
judgment (Wolf, 1999; Nagy, 2005). According to Lu (2005), audit rotation ensures innovativeness. This means 
that it makes people not in the profession to know what it entails and embraces new things that will improve the 
profession. Finally, it has been observed that both auditors and clients suffer great losses in cases of audit failures. 
Although, there is associated cost when rotating auditors, this cost however is less than the cost of excessive 
litigation and loss of reputation due to such audit failures.  
A long auditor- client relationship could lead to an alignment of the auditor’s interest and that of its client 
which makes the supposed independent behavior of the auditor to be doubted. The study concluded that audit firm 
rotation does not enhance audit independence in Ethiopia. This could be due to the unity of professional attitude 
among auditors. Eba and Oliyad (2013) argued that auditors that are engaged in a long term relationship may signal 
skepticism with regards to the perception of the auditor’s objectively, independence and audit quality. The study 
concludes that a policy favoring mandatory rotation of auditors could have positive effects on the quality of audit 
reports as it would allow for fresh insight and restore public confidence in the audit function.  
Nashwa (2004) work did not support that mandatory rotation improves audit quality. He attempted to verify 
the association between a long tenure auditor client -relationship and audit failures. The collected data showed that 
failure occurs more frequently in the first 3 years and in 7 or more of audit tenure. Furthermore, the failure rates 
were computed by relating the number of failures in each tenure class to the total number of audits involving the 
same period of tenure. To address the issue more deeply, a logistic model was used to predict failure using tenure 
as the variable. The results indicated that risk increases early in the auditor client relation and then declines 
overtime. The author concluded that the results of his survey do not support the hypothesis that mandatory rotation 
improves audit quality.  
Chung (2004) observed that audit quality appears to improve when the duration of the auditor- client 
relationship is truncated. The study examined the impact of limited auditor tenure on earnings and audit quality. 
Variables of discretionary accruals were used as dependent variables in a cross sectional modified model. The 
samples consist of data from Korean publicly held companies listed on the Korean Stock Exchange, collected in 
the 1985-1995 period. The year in which mandatory rotation was enforced in Korea, 1990 was excluded from the 
sample because it represents a transitional period. Following the auditor’s reasoning, a limit on the length of the 
auditor- client relationship results in greater incentives for auditors to maintain independence. So the firm’s 
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opportunistic manipulation of earnings is efficiently restricted.  
Johnson, Khorana and Reynolds (2002) argued that mandatory rotation may not be the best solution to the 
issue of audit quality. The study examines whether the length of the relationship between a company and audit 
firm is associated with financial reporting quality. Audit reports of a sample of US companies entering into 
bankruptcy during years 1996-1998 were observed. The result indicated that the tenure variable is consistently 
positive and significant. This conclusion is consistent with the position that auditors may be more influenced in 
the first year of engagement and it does not support those who propose that the rotation of auditors must be 
mandatory.  
 
2.3 Audit Quality and Audit Fees  
There are many reasons adduced to cause a positive relationship between auditor fees and audit quality. Quality 
investigation and audit procedures will require more audit hours, higher cost due to the use of more experienced 
and specialized staff and thus, higher audit fees (O’Sullivan, 2000; Ghosh & Pawlewich, 2008). However, large 
audit fees paid by the client make the auditor more economically dependent on the client, thus it forces the auditor 
to be more reluctant in queering the client during the audit for fear of losing the stream of income. After the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOA 2002), total fees of audit firms have increased indicating that total revenues from audit 
clients will increase after the rotation decision. This is due to the increased litigation an auditor would be exposed 
to as a result, the auditor will exert more effort & time and this will impress on him increasing the audit fees 
required (Ghosh & Pawlewich, 2008).  
Companies can experience high start-up costs when hiring a new auditor. By working on the same clients for 
a period of years, auditors can earn client specific quasi- rents that can serve as collateral against opportunistic 
behavior. Larger auditors have ‘more to lose’ from supplying a lower than promised level of audit quality and thus 
have a higher perceived audit quality. De Angelo (1981) also argues that the difference in agency costs indicate a 
differing ‘level of audit quality’. 
Audit fee is the fees paid for annual audits and reviews of financial statements for the most recent fiscal year 
(SEC, Final Rule). Auditor’s fees is considered a measure for the assessment of the audit quality, as it is assumed 
that high audit fees reflects a high quality especially if the audit is performed by a reputable audit firm. Furthermore, 
there are other factor that point to the correlation of audit fees and audit quality. Firstly, if there are any report 
adjustments, the auditor is required to accumulate a greater amount of evidence to achieve the same quality, which 
results in more hours and higher audit fees (Arens & Loebbecke, 1997). Audit fees can also be affected by location 
and the complexity/coordination of an engagement. For example, if the client has multiple locations that require 
visits, the audit fees will be higher. Audit fees can vary with additional reports (Palmrose, 1986). The additional 
report has to do with the location and the fees that is applicable to other firms. The client’s industry can also affect 
audit fees by measuring differences in risk that the firms will surely have different ways of having risk because 
they operate in different ways. Audit fees are also generally higher among companies with public ownership. 
Companies with public ownership are at a greater exposure to risk and thus, require more audit evidence and 
investigation. All of these variables arguably cause difference in fees between a small and large firm. 
According to the Decree of the General Chairman of Indonesian Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 
setting audit fees requires Public Accountants to consider the following characteristics vs client needs, 
independence, the level of expertise and responsibility inherent in the work performed, the duties and 
responsibilities according to law, and the complexity level of the job done. While the Rules of Ethics of Certified 
Public Accountants Compartment (2001) opines that the amount of fees depends on the following matters: risk 
assignment, the complexity of services provided, level of expertise required to perform such services and the cost 
structure of audit firm. 
 
2.4 Audit Qualities and Company Size  
In view of the global recession of 2009-2010, when investments in banks and financial institutions was unsafe and 
caused a financial meltdown that required strong input and investment by most democratic governments, the need 
for internationally regulated and well audited financial institutions have started to concentrate on serious internal 
audit processes undertaken by an internal audit team that conducts regular control assessments. Small public 
accounting firms is higher than big public accounting firm. A large number of small firm causes a high level of 
competition in the acquisition of clients, this require a small firm to pay attention to the appearance of staff. 
According to Mustafa (2009), to improve the appearance, quality and image of public accounting investment 
should be planned and prepared; it causes the firm to leave the lower prices. 
 
2.5 Audit Quality and Board Independence  
Board independence is also a factor that contributes to audit quality, because research suggests that board 
independence is negatively related to the likelihood of financial fraud and SEC enforcement actions (Beasley, 
1996; Dechow, Sloan & Sweeney; 1996). While some researchers find that a large board has more expertise than 
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a small one(Dalton, Daily, Johnson & Ellstrand, 1999), that it tends to be more effective in monitoring accrual 
(Xie, Davidson & Dadalt, 2003) and that it leads to a lower cost of debt( Anderson, Mansi & Reeb; 2004). Others 
suggest that a small board is more effective in mitigating the agency costs associated with a large board (Yermack, 
1996; Eisenberg, Sungren & Wells, 1998; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998, 2003). (Conger, Finegold &Lawler 111; 
1998) suggests that board that meets frequently signal board effectiveness.  
Vafeas (1999) finds that it is inversely related to firm value, because of the increased board activities 
following share price declines. Abdullah, Ismail and Jamaluddin (2008) examined effective components of 
corporate governance in Malaysian listed companies and their: relationship with audit quality. A total of 655 
companies were selected as: the sample; representing 73.84% of the total number of companies across. Industries 
in the year 2003. The analysis of logistic regression was used to investigate the relationship between dependent 
and independent variables. Their results showed that 2 independent variables had a significant relationship with 
audit firm size. The linkage between the board and the quality of audit activities done may be formal or informal. 
Farman and Jensen (1993) have observed that the board of directors is the best control mechanism to monitor 
actions of management. The study explored board independence based on the agency theory Studies of O’Sullivan 
(2000) and Salleh (2006) found that the proportion of non-executive directors had a significant positive impact on 
audit quality.  
According to Wan, Shahnazi, & Nurasyikiri (2008), the relationship between outside shareholders and 
managers is marked by circumstances and opportunism, which emanate from unequal distribution of information 
since the responsibility of financial reporting increases with the separation of ownership and control. Kane and 
Velury (2002) posit that the greater the level of the board independence, the more likely it is for firm to purchase 
audit services from large audit firm in order to ensure high audit quality. As it is applicable to auditors, so is it with 
the boards of an organization, they are expected to be independent. If there is a lack of board independence, it 
leads to board bias, lack of trust on the part of the workers and clients and eventually all fall in audit quality.  
 
3. The Research Methods and Materials   
Choosing the types of research method and materials technique are depends upon the area of research, research 
methodology, and preference of the researcher according to (Dawson, 2002) 
 
3.1 Description of Population of the Study 
The banking sector is one and the unique among all sectors of the economy in Ethiopia because it plays a central 
role in contributing to the financial stability of the economy and the provision of financial resources (NBE 
committee on banking supervision, 2013). There are 17 commercial banks in Ethiopia as at October 2010 EC and 
15 banks for a period of 2004-2010 form the sample in this study.  
 
3.2 Sampling Techniques and Sample Size 
Two types of sampling techniques were employed by the researcher, namely, simple random sampling and 
stratified random sampling. The sample of 15 Commercial banks was chosen by simple random sampling 
technique. Simple random sampling techniques were used in the selection of the population. While stratified 
random technique was used in administering the questionnaires. Stratification contributes to sampling efficiency 
by lowering variances in the population. This is because using the stratified sampling method, we sample 
homogenous units. 
 
3.3 Sources of Data Collection  
Primary and secondary data were used to collect data needed for the research. The primary information was 
collected through the distribution of questionnaires and the secondary sources mostly annual reports and published 
journals.  
 
3.4 Method of Data Presentation  
To aid analysis and enhance understanding and comprehension on the part of the reading public, the data so 
collected will be presented in a tabular form. This method is chosen because of the simplicity and straight to the 
point posture. 
 
3.5 Method of Data Analysis   
For the purpose of this work, the following variables are considered relevant in the specification of our model and 
in examining the relationship between audit firm rotation and audit quality. The model was self-built and the 
functional form is given below. 
AQ = bo +b1afr + b2af + b3cs + b4bi+UT………….eq (1)  
Where; AQ = Audit Quality  
           AFR = Audit Firm Rotation  
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            AF = Audit Fees  
             CS = Company Size  
              BI = Board Independence  
                U1 = Error term  
The model prior Expectation is that B1, B3, and B4 > 0, B2 < 0  
The model above is analyzed using the binary logic regression technique. According to Gauss-Markov 
theorem which states that if the underlying system linear with additive noise and the random variables representing 
the errors made by ordinary least square model are uncorrelated from each other and if the distributions of these 
random variables all have the same variance and a mean of zero, then the ordinary least squares method is the best 
unbiased linear estimator of the model coefficients. Furthermore, diagnostic test was carried out to determine the 
suitability of the use of the ordinary least method. Regression diagnostic is one of a set of procedures available for 
regression analysis that seek to assess the validity of a model in any of a number of different ways.    
 
4. Presentation of Data 
In this subsection, tables have been used to present the descriptive statistics, Pearson correlation, and binary logit 
regression result as estimated by using the STATA version 12 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics result 
For this research both descriptive and inferential statistical analysis is used as below 
Table4.1 Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
 AQ AFR AF BI CS 
Mean  0.971429 0.130794 89294.65 0.631514 7.887803 
Std.Dev.  0.167398 0.336005 67351.5 0.143167 1.044442 
      
Jarque-Bera  4505.739 116.6509 97.20953 1.303548 16.99693 
Probability  0 0 0 0.52112 0.000204 
Observations  105 105 105 105 105 
Source: Researcher’s Computation, 2018 
According to descriptive analysis in the above table reveals that, the means of the independent variables, the 
mean value for audit firm rotation (AFR) is 13%, company size (CS) is 7.89 while audit fees (AF) is Nearly 89295. 
The mean value for audit fees reveals the average amount of money paid by the banks examined for audit services.  
BOD Independence stood at approximately 63%. Thus, the BOD of the banks examined can be adjudged slightly 
independent since the mean value is slightly above 50%. Based on the Jarque-Bera Statistics and associated 
probability, it is observed that all the variables examined except for BOD independence can be said to be normally 
distributed since all the probability values are lower than 0.05 which is the rule of thumb test for the normality of 
a distribution  
Table 4.2: Pearson Correlation 
 AQ AFR AF BI CS 
AQ 1 -0.2748239 0.015252 0.043093 -0.01201 
AFR -0.27482 1 0.17881 -0.018 -0.00622 
AF 0.015252 0.1788102 1 -0.10058 -0.01356 
BI 0.043093 -0.0179983 -0.10058 1 0.037346 
CS -0.01201 -0.0062181 -0.01356 0.037346 1 
Source: Researcher’s Computation, 2018 
Table 4.2 above shows the Pearson correlation of all examined variables for this study. The table shows that 
a 1-unit change in AQ is negatively related to approximately 0.27-unit change in AFR and to 0.012-unit change in 
CS while it is positively related to 0.015-unit change in AF and to 0.04-unit change in BI. Furthermore, all the 
independent variables have a weak relationship with AQ except for AFR, which has fair strong relationship.  
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4.2 Regression Estimation Result  
Table 4.3: Regression Result Extract  
Dependent variable: AQ     
Method: ML-Binary Logit Model     
Variable Coeff Std. Error Z-Statistic Prob 
C  2.403127  6.232949  0.385552  0.6998  
AFR  -3.19321  1.445779  -2.20864  0.0272  
AF  L.03E-05  L.47E-05  0.699863  0.484  
BI  1.990916  4.067303  0.489493  0.6245  
CS  0.024323  0.616654  0.039444  0.9685  
McFadden R-squared  021152  Mean depreciation variable   0.971429  
LR statistic  5.762989  Total   105  
Prob (LR statistic)  0.217561     
Source: Researcher’s Computation, 2018 
Table 4.3 is an extract of the regression result for the model as specified for this study. Based on the McFadden 
R-square, which reveals the combined explanatory effect of all the independent variables on the dependent, it is 
observed that all the independent variables can only account for about 21% of the systematic variation in the 
dependent variable leaving about 79% unaccounted for by variables not captured in the model. As regards the LR 
statistic and related probability value of 5.76 and 0.2 18 respectively, the overall significance of the model is poor 
as the probability value is greater than 0.05. Thus, all the variables in the model when combined do not significantly 
affect audit quality. 
With respect to the sign of the Z-statistics of the independent variables, only audit firm rotation (AFR) has a 
negative association with audit quality (AQ). All other independent variables have a positive association. 
Furthermore, based on the probability values of the Z-statistics of the independent variables, board independence 
(BI), audit fees (AF), and company size (CS) have an insignificant relationship with audit quality. However, audit 
firm rotation (AFR) has a significant relationship at the 5% level of significance.  
 
4.3 Hypothesis Testing  
For the purpose of better understanding, the hypotheses are restated and tested in this section. And for this study, 
the decision rule is to reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative if the probability value of the t-statistics 
is less than 0.05 or accept the null and reject the alternative if the probability value is greater than 0.05.  
Hypothesis One 
HO: Audit firm rotation contributes negatively to the quality of audit assignment. 
HI: Audit firm rotation contributes positively to the quality of audit assignment.  
With respect to the findings in table 4.3, the study concludes that audit firm rotation significantly negatively affect 
audit quality at 5% significance level as such, the null hypothesis is rejected. This finding is in line with the findings 
of Raiborn (2006), Cameron, Principe, Trumbo (2007). However, it negates the findings of, Chung (2004), 
Adeyemi and Okpala (2011).  
Hypothesis Two 
HO: There is no significant relationship between the firm’s size and audit quality. 
HI: There is significant relationship between the firm’s size and audit quality. 
It is observed from table 4.2.3 above that company size and audit quality have an insignificant positive relationship 
at 5% level of significance. Thus, this finding suggests that null hypothesis two should be accepted while the 
alternative is rejected. The finding there from is contrary to the findings by Adeyemi and Fagbemi (2010) but 
confirms the findings of Donovan (1997)  
Hypothesis Three 
HO: There is no significant relationship between board independence and audit quality. 
HI: There is significant relationship between board independence and audit quality. 
As regards the third hypothesis, the findings above show that audit fees do not significant affect audit quality at 
5%% level of significance Therefore, the null hypothesis is thus accepted. This finding is in line with the findings, 
however, it negates the findings of Arens and Loeb (1997), Ghosh and Pawlewich (2008).  
Hypothesis Four 
HO: There is no significant relationship between board independence and audit quality. 
HI: There is significant relationship between board independence and audit quality. 
With respect to the findings of this study as it relates to board independence and audit quality, the study concludes 
that there is an insignificant positive relationship between these two variables at 5% significance level thus the 
null hypothesis is accepted. This finding is in line with the findings of Beasley, (1996), Dechow, Sloan and 
Sweeney (1996). However, it negates the findings of O’Sullivan (2000) and Saleh (2006), Kane and Velury (2002).  
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5. Summary of Findings  
The objective of this study is to evaluate the relationship between audit firm rotation and audit quality using a 
sample of 15 banks. The study attempted to provide empirical evidence of this relationship (if any) within the 
Ethiopian context. The findings that were gotten from the study were,  
 Audit firm rotation significantly affect audit quality.  
 There is no significant positive relationship between company size and audit quality.  
 Audit fees does not significantly affect audit quality.  
 There is no significant positive relationship between board independence and audit quality. 
 
5.1 Conclusion 
The debate on audit quality and audit firm rotation is not a settled matter. This study intended to assess the 
applicability of the mandatory auditor rotation concept in the Ethiopian banking sector so as to enhance and 
improve audit quality. The model introduced used different proxies such as audit fees, company size and board 
independence. It therefore concludes that rotation is a good solution to enhance and maintain the auditor 
independence by decreasing the audit firm’s dependency on the client.  
 
5.2 Recommendations  
 From the findings of both the literature as well as the field study, the following are recommended. 
Regulatory bodies such as National Bank of Ethiopia and the Federal Auditor of General Office should 
help in making laws that will guide to audit firm rotation and improve audit quality. 
  In addition, the National Bank of Ethiopia should also think possible other ways of enhancing audit 
quality.    
 Concerning the audit fees, Federal General Auditor office should have to fix rate for certain auditor type.  
 That the independence of the board of directors should be strengthened i.e. the composition of non-
executive directors as members of the boards should be sustained and improved upon.  
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